![]() ![]() The problem is just what would those forms be? Would there be, for instance, only perfect forms for abstract concepts, like beauty, truth, honour, justice, knowledge? Or would there also be perfect forms for objects in the world – the prefect table, chair, and so on? And what about measures, like big or small? And so it goes. That 'real' world would be without contradiction and it would therefore be composed of perfect (that is, unchanging) forms. My understanding of all this is that Socrates believes that the world we live in is basically ‘unreal’ – that is, because it changes, and change invariably involves a contradiction (things are and are not at the same time) and because the true cannot involve a contradiction, then the world we live in can’t be the really real world. It challenges many of the assumptions associated with Plato’s view of the nature of his ‘forms’ – and so, given Socrates went on to continue to support his view on these forms, I assume Socrates wasn’t ultimately convinced by the arguments Parmenides gives – even if he seems to accept them in this dialogue. This one is again one of those dialogues that is reported from a long time before – much like The Symposium – but this one goes right back to when Socrates was a very young man. ![]() I find I quickly get lost with many philosophical arguments – Sartre does this to me too, which is annoying, because other things he writes make complete sense to me. ![]() In part, this dialogue was simply too hard for me. ![]()
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